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Abstract: This paper focuses on the ambivalent relationships between entrepreneurial 
minorities and the state and its representatives. On the one hand, the (colonial) state 
encouraged entrepreneurial minorities to settle in its territories in return for tax exemptions, 
religious freedom and security. In turn, the minorities would provide the rulers with credit, 
financial services and pay tax.  On the other hand, the minorities realized that their personal 
security and properties would always be at stake; rulers could change their minds and favour 
other communities or the rulers could themselves be displaced. The case of the South Asians 
in East Africa presents an illuminating example of continuity and discontinuity in the process 
of the inclusion and exclusion of entrepreneurial minorities in wider society.2 
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Dick Douwes, Bregje van Eekelen and Alex van Stipriaan. An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at the European Social Science History Conference in Gent (2010) where I 
received useful comments from Dirk Hoerder, Marlou Schrover, Veerle Vanden Daelen, Mary 
Heidhues and Bruce Whitehouse. In 2001, WOTRO Science for Global Development awarded 
me a post-doctoral fellowship, while the ESHCC allowed me to spend 12 months in East 
Africa for fieldwork a year later. The research is based on archival as well as oral history 
conducted in the period between 1999 and 2003, including a year of fieldwork between July 
2002 and July 2003 and six weeks in 2008. I made extensive use of the Tanzania National 
                                                 
1 Catch-22 is a satirical, historical novel by the American author Joseph Heller, which was first published in 
1961. The novel is set during the later stages of World War II. The main character, Yossarian, tries to avoid 
taking up his military responsibilities by completing a form that will be accepted as a declaration of insanity. 
However, his superior reasons that if he is able to fill in that form, he must be mentally well enough to 
undertake his military role. It could be described as a vicious circle.  
2 While South Asians are internally far from monolithic, I use the term to refer to people who migrated to East 
Africa from the South Asian subcontinent, which now includes the nations of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
Archives (hereafter TNA) and the Kenyan National archives (KNA) as well as the Public 
Record Office (PRO) in London, where I saw documents from the Colonial Office (CO) and the 
Foreign Office (FO). I also collected many publications from European as well as Indian 
travellers in East Africa. Over the years, including the period after 2003, I conducted more 
than 300 interviews mainly in Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar and Nairobi. This material is especially 
relevant for any discussion of the post-colonial period. 
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Introduction 
The earliest contact between the Indian subcontinent and East Africans goes back at least 
2000 years. The first undisputed written evidence of this is Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, 
which was written by a Greek navigator in the first century CE. When Vasco da Gama arrived 
in Mozambique, Mombasa and Malindi in 1498, he was surprised at the number of Arabs 
and Indians he found there.3 Direct trade between these regions was maintained by the 
rhythm of the monsoons. Until 1870, South Asians were a good example of the concept of 
‘strangers’ developed by the sociologist George Simmel in the late 19th century. Simmel 
defines strangers as traders and businessmen who come and go and maintain some distance 
from local society for cultural and economic reasons.4 Historical evidence shows that 
migration is just one of the options families may consider in an attempt to prosper 
elsewhere. East Africa was a new opportunity for Indian farmers and traders in the late 
nineteenth century.5 They often did not intend to settle elsewhere permanently. Indeed, 
around 1875, the British Consul of Zanzibar, Sir Bartle Frere, emphasized:  
  
“They [the Indians] never take their families to Africa; the head of the house of 
business always remains in India, and their books are balanced periodically in India. 
The house in Africa is merely a branch house, though many of those people will 
assure you, and they give very good evidence of the fact, that they have had 
branches in Africa for 300 years, and possibly for much more.”6 
 
                                                 
3 For more on this early period, see the notable work of: M.N. Pearson, Port cities and intruders: The Swahili 
coast, India, Portugal in the early modern area (Baltimore and London, 1998); K.N. Chaudhury, Trade and 
Civilization in the Indian Ocean: An economic history from the rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge 1985); and, by 
the same author, Asia before Europe: Economy and civilization of the Indian ocean from the rise of Islam to 
1750 (Cambridge 1990); Edward Alpers, East Africa and the Indian ocean (Princeton  2009); A. Sheriff, Dhow 
cultures of the Indian ocean (London  2010). 
4 See also: W. Sombart, The Jews and modern capitalism, (London 1982 [1911]); G. Simmel, The stranger, in 
K.H. Wolff (ed), The sociology of George Simmel, (New York 1950) 402-408. 
5 Many of the early settlers had a background in agriculture. However, it is likely that migrants from Indian rural 
areas underwent an initiation period in the Indian ports, where they – under the guidance of family and 
community members – learned something of overseas trade.  See A. Sheriff, The rise of a commercial empire: 
An aspect of the economic history of Zanzibar, 1770-1873. Ph.D. thesis (University of London 1971) 127. 
6 Bartle Frere, Extracts from the evidence taken before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, CO, 
1887. See also Richard Burton, Zanzibar city (London 1872) 329-335. The first volume of Cynthia Salvadori’s 
fieldwork account: We came in dhows (Nairobi 1996), contains a few oral testimonies of families who kept 
trading branches in Bombay and other places in India as well. 
In other words, it was often not the head of the family who first explored East Africa. Neither 
was it the eldest son, who was supposed to stay with his father. Therefore, it is plausible that 
only the second or third son was sent to Zanzibar. Moreover, even after this son had made 
several profitable journeys to and from India, the families would not generally settle in East 
Africa. A process of circular migration and slow settlement indicates that only those who 
were successful remained and eventually settled with their wives and families. Despite the 
economic attractions and the cautious process of settlement, many South Asians did not find 
what they were looking for or failed in their endeavours and returned to India.7 
Nevertheless, from the Indian business family’s perspective, East Africa was a new 
opportunity that arose in the late nineteenth century.  
The general migration history of Asian East Africans is well documented from the late 
nineteenth century onwards. In the period between 1880 and 1920, the number of South 
Asians in East Africa grew from about 6,000 to 54,000. These included Hindus (among them 
castes well-known for their business acumen/interests/expertise such as Bhatias, Patels, 
Lohanas and Shahs), Muslims (especially Ithnasheries, Bohras and Ismailis), Sikhs, Jains, 
Goans, and others. The various Asian business families who arrived in the late nineteenth 
century developed far more intimate social and economic relationships with each other than 
they had previously maintained in India. Their shared knowledge of the Gujurati/Cutchi 
language, and their minority status (never more than two per cent of the total population in 
East Africa; somewhat higher in the main trading ports) in a new society, played an 
important role in this.8 However, this process of permanent settlement was the outcome of 
a process of semi-permanent settlement and circular migration.9  
South Asians played an important and dominant role in the East African economy. 
Here, I argue that the economic and physical security of South Asians in East Africa 
depended on their ability to negotiate mutual economic interests with rulers, often in return 
                                                 
7 Earlier, Claude Markovits made a strong case against the idea of permanent settlement. He argued that the 
majority of Indian migrants in the nineteenth century were not permanent, but temporary migrants: Markovits, 
The global world of Indian merchants, 1750-1947. Traders of Sind from Bukhara to Panama (Cambridge 2000) 
7. See also: Claude Markovits, ‘Indian Merchant Networks Outside India in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries: A Preliminary Survey’, Modern Asian Studies, 33:4 (1999) 883-911. 
8 R.G. Gregory, South Asians and East Africa: An Economic and Social History 1890 – 1980 (Boulder Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1993), 1-15. 
9 Gijsbert Oonk, Settled Strangers: Asian Business Elites in East Africa, 1800-2000 (Delhi 2013). 
for their safety. However, their physical presence and economic dominance produced a 
destructive reaction from local communities and, at times, these same rulers. The major 
concern of states and societies was that South Asians were seen as temporary migrants who 
were in Africa to exploit Africans and would eventually return home or, at the very least, 
extract profits from the continent and re-invest them elsewhere.  
Entrepreneurial minorities constantly have to deal with these notions of the (colonial) 
state and local citizens. Even after three or four generations of running local trading 
companies and spending money on charities, temples, mosques, local education, hospitals, 
dispensaries etc., they realize that these efforts are never enough for them to be accepted 
as locally loyal; they will always be seen as outsiders. In his inaugural lecture at the 
University of Cape Town, Mahmood Mamdani rhetorically asked: when does a settler 
become a native? And his brief answer was: from the point of view of ethnic citizenship, 
NEVER.10 The uninterrupted production of negative images by natives and the state 
ultimately explains why entrepreneurial minorities themselves also continue to be 
ambivalent towards their local habitat. As hostile political and economic atmospheres arose 
from time to time, it was often very sensible for the South Asians in East Africa to maintain 
business and family ties with other countries. In fact, these transnational ties (which are 
much broader than the ties with the ‘motherland’) often become a vital factor in the 
historical development of entrepreneurial minorities, as I argue in this article. 
In this paper, I argue that the South Asians were victims of their own success, caught 
up in what I term the middleman minority’s Catch-22. This is described as a vicious circle 
from which it is almost impossible to emerge. The ambivalent relationship between rulers, 
the state and the entrepreneurial minorities remained remarkably similar over a period of 
two centuries, despite the huge change in East Africa from Arabic rule to European 
colonization to the independence of African states/countries. The major ingredient in this 
process is the rulers’ interests in the economic services of the Asians. In return, they would 
provide profitable terms and economic and physical security.  
The catch-22 is as follows: (1) the Arab, British and German rulers attracted South 
Asians to East Africa in return for tax exemptions, religious freedom and the protection of 
                                                 
10 Mahmood Mamdani, When does a settler become a native? Reflection of the Colonial Roots of Citizenship in 
Equatorial and South Africa, Inaugural Lecture, 13th May 1998 at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. 
Capitals in original. 
properties. In return, the South Asians acted as money-lenders for the rulers, invested in 
large projects and helped them to develop the region. In other cases, they financed 
businesses, which benefitted the rulers through taxes. Here, it is important to note that the 
rulers and (colonial) states who did this bypassed local entrepreneurs and therefore created 
an often unintended divide between those who were encouraged with incentives (in this 
case, the South Asians) and the locals, who were taken for granted (in this case, Arabs and 
Africans); (2) the South Asians in East Africa often realized that their businesses and personal 
security were always going to be at risk because: (a) rulers can change, and different rulers 
may well have different opinions about their/the strangers importance and future welfare, 
and (b) African societies often disliked them because of their extreme wealth, and many 
African chiefs and locals were indebted to them; (3) the South Asians in East Africa made 
sure that they set up physical economic escape routes. In the short run, they initially kept 
their headquarters in India, while those who eventually moved their base to Africa 
sometimes established foreign branches of their businesses or opened foreign bank 
accounts. In addition, it was at times part of a family’s politics to keep some family members 
abroad; and (4) knowledge of these escape routes led to more ambivalence about the South 
Asians in local African societies. Even those who took up local citizenship after independence 
were viewed with suspicion because of the connections and security they maintained 
abroad. The South Asians have, in a manner of speaking, kept one foot in Africa and one 
elsewhere. This suggests that migrants and societies may change, adapt and integrate for 
generations. However, unless the middleman minority’s catch-22 is resolved, the basic 
motivating factors for expulsion, ethnic cleansing and harsh anti-multicultural attitudes will 
remain. 11 
In this paper I examine three different phases in the history of East Africa: the pre-
colonial era (until around 1890); the colonial era (1890–1961); and the post-colonial era to 
2000. At first sight, one might expect that the relationship between entrepreneurial 
minorities and the state and society in these periods would be very different. In the pre-
colonial era we speak of sultanates, personalized states and tribal rulers. In the colonial era, 
European rulers (specifically British and German colonial rule in East Africa) introduced 
                                                 
11 The catch 22 thesis has some interesting similarities with the Strangers Code of Bruce Whitehouse in this 
volume and Bruce Whitehouse, Migrants and strangers in an African city. Exile, dignity, Belonging 
(Bloomington Indiana University Press 2012) 116-149. 
formal legislation, tax payments and an institutionalized system of law and order. In the 
independent post-colonial era, the sovereignty of the East African states was recognized and 
self-rule was attained. However, despite these fundamental changes, there are striking 
continuities in the relationships between outsiders and both the state and societies.   
 
 
 
The pre-colonial era until 1890 
 
When the Sultan of Oman, Seyyid Said, moved his capital from Oman to Zanzibar in 1832, a 
new area of opportunities for South Asian and Arab traders developed in the Indian Ocean 
region. Seyyid Said may have foreseen the commercial prospects of Zanzibar, especially with 
respect to the slave and ivory trade. Many South Asian traders and moneylenders in Oman 
were commercially involved with the Sultan’s empire and followed him by settling in 
Zanzibar. Indeed, he encouraged them to do so and to make Zanzibar the new capital of his 
empire by offering a variety of incentives, including guarantees of religious tolerance, a 
maximum of five per cent duty on imports, and the removal of restrictions on the ownership 
of land by South Asians. He also granted the South Asians permission to trade on the 
previously restricted Mrima coast. By the 1840s, the South Asians were also allowed to 
acquire property and own clove plantations there. In addition, the Sultan appointed the 
South Asian Bhatia, Jairam Sewji, as his chief customs collector.12 With the exception of 
some brief periods, Jairam Sewji served for almost 70 years in this position. This led to the 
recruitment of hundreds of other Bhatias from India, who Sewji set up in business in the 
Zanzibar commercial empire. As well as frequently acting as customs collectors along the 
coast, the Bhatias were also moneylenders and traders.13 
Seyyid Said’s successor, Seyyid Bargash, followed in his footsteps and continued to 
attract South Asian traders and financiers. He even wanted them to settle in Zanzibar with 
their wives and families to ensure a more permanent business community on the island. He 
also encouraged Hindus to bring their wives to his realm.14 Indeed, in the 1880s, it is 
reported that Bargash sent his private vessel to welcome the first Hindu woman to the 
                                                 
12 Bhatias are a Hindu trading caste, with their origins in Gujarat and Kutch in Northwest India. Recently, C. 
Goswami published an excellent book on the early trade routes, with special reference to Sewji. C. Goswami, 
The call of the sea: Kachchhi traders in Muscat and Zanzibar, c. 1800–1880 (New Delhi 2011). 
13 W. G. Palgrave, The narrative of a years journey through East Africa (London 1865) 369-70. Sir Bartle 
Frere, the British Consul in Zanzibar, described the Bhatias as “probably the most important by wealth 
and influence”, see CO memorandum by Sir Bartle Frere, correspondence 1856, 100. 
14 Hindus tended to settle later with their wives than Muslims due to their notion of purity regarding food 
habits and marriage patterns. For Hindus in East Africa it was difficult for them to continue some of their very 
strict food habits and remain vegetarians. Another important aspect of the notion of Hindu purity was their 
emphasis on marrying within their own sub-castes or jatis. However, being a small migrant community in East 
Africa meant that they had to alter some of their notions of purity in order to adapt to the (colonial) African 
environment. This was a slow and sometimes painful process; James Christie, Cholera epidemics in East Africa 
(London 1876) 345. See Gijsbert Oonk, ‘The Changing Culture of the Hindu Lohana community in East Africa’, 
Contemporary South Asia 13:1 (2004) 7-23. 
country, giving her a reward of Shs 250. As a pledge of his good intentions, Bargash also 
promised to turn Zanzibar’s Old Fort into a residence for the wives of merchants and offered 
to equip it with water pipes fitted with silver taps to ensure that the Hindu women need 
never appear in public.15 This encouragement occurred precisely at the time that the Hindu 
community in Gujarat revolted successfully against Brahmin priests and religious customs, 
which were restricting their mercantile activities and making overseas commerce difficult.16 
All of these activities paved the way for the arrival of Hindu migrants and settlers in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries. 17 
From the above, it can be seen that the South Asian community was economically 
important to the Arab rulers in Zanzibar and the coastal areas of East Africa. The settlers 
were welcomed by rulers such as Seyyid Said, who favoured them with both minor 
incentives and more generous gestures, such as tax reductions and government protection. 
The latter was important, as is clear from the diary of the Arabic Princess Salme for the year 
1886. In the diary, the princess recalls how the end of Ramadan was celebrated in Zanzibar 
during her childhood. Bullocks and other animals were killed in the yards of many Arab and 
Muslim homes, but Hindus avoided these places for religious reasons; as many of them were 
strict vegetarians, they would have been shocked by these animals being slaughtered, 
especially when this included the massacre of holy cows. Some Arabs provoked the Hindus 
about these religious sentiments: 
“On such an evening, our slaughtering yard was changed into a lake 
of blood; for this reason all the Banyans at Zanzibar, who are 
vegetarians, looked upon our feast with much horror, and took care 
not to come near any such places at this time. I have already spoken 
of these Banyans (caste of money-lenders, G.O.) as the principal 
traders and money-lenders in the town, and in the last capacity they 
are, beyond a doubt, the greatest cut-throats imaginable; they are 
bitterly hated on this account, and on occasions like these there is a 
                                                 
15 Contemporary sources on the position (and absence) of Hindu women in East Africa include: Burton, 
Zanzibar: City island and coast, 329-35; and F.B. Pearce, Zanzibar. The island metropolis of Eastern Africa 
(London 1920) 257. Unfortunately, we do not know the name of the first Hindu woman in Zanzibar. See also M. 
Honey, A History of Indian Merchant Capita and Class Formation in Tanganyika c. 1880-1940. (Unpublished Ph-
D thesis, Dar es Salaam) 74. 
16 A. M. H. Sheriff, The rise of a commercial empire: An aspect of the economic history of Zanzibar (1770-1879), 
(Unpublished Ph-D thesis, University of London 1971) 354. 
17 See, G. Oonk, Settled strangers.  
splendid opportunity for their victims to take revenge upon them. 
Among the lower-class people it is a standing joke to entice the 
Banyans, who never allowed any chance of business to slip out of 
their grasp, under the pretence of some important order, into these 
blood streaming yards, which is the greatest insult that can be 
offered to the star-worshippers, of whom it can be said, however, in 
spite of their low moral standing, that they adhere religiously to their 
code in being strict vegetarians.”18 
 
[insert picture 005 Princess Salme around here;  text: Princess Salme of Zanzibar 
and Oman, 1844-1924] 
 
The above makes it clear that Hindus were not very popular among the lower classes 
of the Zanzibari people. The reason given in Princess Salme’s text is that Hindus were well-
known moneylenders and traders who advanced money on landed security or credited trade 
goods. Many lower-class Swahili and Arabs felt that they were being cheated by them. Salme 
portrays the Hindus as “the greatest cut-throats imaginable” with a “low moral standing”.19  
I am not going to debate the truth of these allegations. The overall situation seems to be 
that the putative attacks on and attitudes towards the Hindus (a) show that they needed 
government protection, and (b) led them to close ranks and live together. In addition, new 
Hindu migrants who settled temporarily in East Africa tended to live in the same areas, 
because it was almost unthinkable at the time to share food with people from different 
backgrounds.20 
 There are a few other examples, which are not well known, where the South Asians 
were protected as a group of potential investors who were needed for economic 
development purposes. In 1887, for example, Chief Bushiri from Pangani intended to start a 
rebellion against the Germans in Bagamoyo (in modern-day Tanzania), who tried to establish 
colonial rule on the continent. Bushiri informed the South Asians of his plans in advance, 
                                                 
18 Emile Ruette, Princess Salme of Zanzibar and Oman, Memoires of an Arabian Princess (Zanzibar: Gallery 
Publications 1998 [1886]) 133-134. 
19 Ibid. 134-136. 
20 I have dealt with the issue of the food habits of South Asians in East Africa, in G. Oonk, ‘The changing culture 
of the Hindu Lohana community in East Africa’, Contemporary Asian Studies, 13:1 (2004) 23. 
allowing them to move to Zanzibar and take most of their portable property with them. 
However, elsewhere, the rebels refused to let the South Asians leave, although they 
maintained that they had no quarrel with them (the South Asians, G.O.) and their presence 
was necessary for trade.21 The insurgents presented a written document to the British 
Consul General in Zanzibar, guaranteeing the Indians’ safety.22 In other words, the 
importance of respecting property rights was acknowledged by the chiefs, albeit only in a 
quasi-formal (i.e. not legally formalized) manner. A good relationship with indigenous rulers 
in an unstable regime was an important way in which South Asians could try to protect their 
property. 
In brief, in the pre-colonial era, some aspects of the middleman minority’s catch-22 
arose. The South Asians were invited to settle in East Africa, and were given various 
incentives to encourage them to do so, such as tax exemptions and rights to practise their 
religion. There was also a self-imposed tendency to live close together. In addition, when 
Sultan Seyyid invited Jairam Sewji to be his chief customs collector, he invited his fellow 
caste members to join him. As a consequence, he probably consciously excluded Arab and 
other traders and investors.   
The evidence is sketchy and unclear, but it is plausible that the negative feelings of 
Zanzibaris occurred because of these types of network from which they were excluded. In 
addition, many Zanzibaris were indebted to the South Asians.  This may therefore have 
encouraged the notion of the exploiter with a low moral standing, according to Princess 
Salme and the lower classes of the Zanzibar community. Occasionally, there was a 
spontaneous outbreak of violence against the South Asians, and their wealth and property 
rights were put at risk. However, the sources do not reveal how the South Asians responded 
to these difficult situations. Did they arm themselves, for example? The next section will 
show that they did indeed request the right to arm themselves, but there is no evidence for 
this period. Did they use their overseas networks to secure their profits? Or were their 
property rights acknowledged by the rulers? The case of the African Chief Bushiri indicates 
that there was a strong mutual understanding between the South Asians and the rulers. 
Bushiri effectively enabled the Asians to secure their properties. At this stage, however, I did 
                                                 
21 FO C.B. Euan-Smith to Salisbury, telex, 30 Sept & 5 Oct 1888; despatch, 9 October 1888 in Further 
Correspondence relating to Zanzibar, Africa No. 10 (London 1888) C. 5603, 57-8, 89. 
22 Ibid. 
not find any evidence that local rulers were arguing that the South Asians were exploiting 
the local populations by extracting wealth to India or any other area.  
The colonial states, 1890–1961 
The acceptance of the Act of Berlin in 1890 was an important step in the partition of 
East Africa between British and German colonial powers. Both countries aimed to abolish 
the slave trade, to undertake the commercial development of the area and to support the 
missionary enterprise. This was a monumental task that turned East Africa into a laboratory 
for experiments with economic and political development models as well as into an area 
with racism and ethnic conflicts.23 It soon became clear that the “White Man’s burden” 24 
could not be borne without the help of the brown man.  
British officials were well aware that South Asians would become important local 
partners in the apparatus of the colonial states. During the early twentieth century, Winston 
Churchill (1874–1965) visited South and East Africa on several occasions. He had taken a fair 
and progressive stance regarding equal rights for South Asians and Europeans in the area. In 
1902, he realized that: 
 
“The Indian was here long before the first British Official. He may 
point to as many generations of useful industry on the coast and 
inland as the white settlers, especially the most recently arrived 
contingents from South Africa (the loudest against him of all) can 
count the years of residence. Is it possible for any Government, with 
a scrap of respect for honest dealing between men to men, to 
embark on a policy of deliberately squeezing out the native of India 
from regions in which he had established himself under every 
scrutiny of public faith?”25 
  
Another East African official who supported the influx and economic contribution of 
South Asians in East Africa was Harry Hamilton Johnston (1858–1927), a botanist, explorer 
and colonial administrator who foresaw an active role for South Asians in the development 
                                                 
23 E.S. Atieno Odhiambo, T.I. Ouso and J.F.M. Williams, A History of East Africa, (London 1977 (1999); Thomas 
Pakenham, The scramble for Africa, 1876-1912 (London 1992). 
24 "The White Man's Burden" is a famous poem by the English poet Rudyard Kipling. It was originally published 
in the popular magazine McClure's in 1899, with the subtitle The United States and the Philippine Islands.  It 
eventually became a characterization for imperialism that justified the policy as a noble enterprise. 
25 During his Africa tour, Churchill wrote a series of articles in Strand Magazine which were then published in a 
book: My African journey (London 1908). This book was well-known among South Asians in Africa and was 
frequently quoted. 
of East Africa. Johnston served as a special commissioner in Uganda from 1899 until 1901, 
during which time he stated: “East Africa is, and should be, from every point of view, the 
America of the Hindu.”26 Johnston believed that the South Asians should be the settlers in 
East Africa because they were in a better position than the Europeans to strengthen the 
continent.  
 The British settler Lord Delamere (1870–1931) was of an entirely different opinion. 
He was one of a small group of planters and landowners who came from South Africa to the 
Kenyan highlands to develop coffee and tea plantations. He eventually became one of the 
most influential British settlers in Kenya. He also declared, more than once, that Indian 
migration to the colony should be stopped: 
 
“Physically the Indian is not a wholesome influence because of an 
incurable repugnance to sanitation and hygiene. In this respect, the 
African is more civilized than the Indian, being naturally clean in his 
ways, but he [is] prone to follow the examples of those around 
him.”27 
 
Delamere claimed to be the guardian of the innocent and gullible natives. However, he 
adopted this position in order to claim the most fertile lands in Kenya (the so-called ‘white 
lands’) from where both the South Asians and the natives were eventually pushed out.28 
The South Asians were aware that not all of the British were as supportive as Churchill 
and Johnston. Indeed, it was foreseeable that with the growing interest of British settlers like 
Delamere, the British colonials would eventually promote their own rights above those of 
other groups. Consequently, the South Asians started to defend their own interests. One of 
the first leaders of the South Asian community in East Africa was Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee 
(1856–1936). He was born in 1856 in Karachi (now in Pakistan) in a traditional Bohra home 
where education centred almost entirely on religion. Around the age of 20, Jeevanjee left 
                                                 
26 Cited in Robert Gregory, India and East Africa. A history of race relations within the British Empire 1890-1939 
(London 1971) 96. 
27 Rasna Warah, Triple Heritage. A journey to self discovery (Nairobi 1998) 22. 
28 The fertile white lands were eventually allocated to the Europeans. The colonizer also tried to monopolize 
the sale of German assets in German East Africa. Nevertheless, here the Indians managed to get access to the 
auctions and were allowed to bid. Eventually, the Asians would buy several Sisal estates. See G. Oonk, The 
Karimjee Jivanjee family. Merchant princess of East Africa, 1800-2000 (Amsterdam 2009).  
Karachi, looking for a world of new trade opportunities. Among other things, he was the first 
non-white to be appointed to represent the interests of the Indians in the Legislative 
Council, which was established in 1905.29 
 The prime objective of the Legislative Council was to safeguard and champion the 
interests of the people who had emigrated from abroad to settle in Kenya. Those who 
appointed Jeevanjee to this body may have expected that a man of his stature would be 
conservative and a protector of the colonial status quo, within the Council’s overall 
objective. However, the racial discrimination that denied even Jeevanjee the right to live in 
some parts of the town where he resided stung him into political action. He thus established 
the East African Indian National Congress and launched the first important non-white 
newspaper, The African Standard, with the purpose being to give South Asians a voice. This 
voice would reach as far as the British parliament in London and the Indian parliament in 
Delhi. 
Around 1900 he stated: 
“I would go so far as to advocate the annexation of this African 
territory [Kenya] to the Indian Empire, with provincial Government 
under the Indian Viceroy, and let it be opened to us, and in a very few 
years it will be a second India.”30 
 
[Insert here 006 Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee: Text: Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee (1856-1939). ‘(…) 
the man who practically founded the colony of British East Africa (…)’ in Daily Chronicle 1 
September, 1910] 
 
This clearly shows the confidence of part of the South Asian elite in East Africa. They 
were convinced that history was on their side and that they were able – and clearly willing - 
to play an important part in the colonization of East Africa. As we now know, East Africa 
would not become a colony of India, but the struggle for equal rights had begun. The South 
Asian settlers demanded the same rights as the white settlers. Over the first decennia, the 
                                                 
29 For an interesting account of Alibhai Mulla Jivanjee’s life, see the biography written by his grand-daughter 
Zarina Patel, Challenge to colonialism. The struggle of Allibhai Mulla Jeevanjee for equal rights in Kenya (Nairobi 
1997). 
30 A.M. Jeevanjee in Elspeth Huxley, White man’s country. Lord Delamere and the making of Kenya, vol II 
(London 1935) 121. 
South Asians’ demands focused on two interrelated areas: a) they did not want to be seen as 
natives or subjects, and demanded equal civic rights, including the right to settle in areas 
that were reserved for whites only and the right to protect themselves by carrying arms; and 
b) they demanded the same economic rights as whites.  
 
Equal civic rights  
From the perspective of the South Asian settlers, the most important struggle was to gain 
civic rights and thus be able to defend their economic interests. The basic complaint was 
that South Asians were categorized in German and British law as subjects or, in the case of 
Germany, at times, as natives. The South Asians’ concerns were typically resolved by (white) 
colonial officials. The Bagamoyo Indians made formal complaints in 1906 to German officials, 
whereas in 1914 the Tanga Indians submitted a long memorandum on the subject to British 
administrators.31  
 
In 1913, the Bombay Chronicle published an analysis and fierce criticism of the 
discriminatory policies in the British East African Protectorate. The article initially highlights 
the economic and political contribution of South Asians in East Africa, but then cynically 
stresses: 
“And now the Indian cannot acquire property in the uplands, cannot 
carry weapons, cannot enter the Market House in Nairobi, cannot 
travel in comfort on the steamers and railways, cannot have a trial by 
jury, in short cannot be anything else than an undesirable alien 
[emphasis added].”32 
 
 It is clear from the article that while the Germans and the British were colonizing East 
Africa, they were also alienating the South Asians living there. Many South Asian traders and 
businessmen felt that they were unable to compete with Europeans on an equal basis, and, 
at the same time, they were unable to defend their properties and protect their families.  
                                                 
31 Gregory, India and East Africa, 1971, 101-104. 
32 Bombay Chronicle, 19 December 1913, 6. This alienation of the South Asians in East Africa was in sharp 
contrast with their hopes for a better future. Just after the First World War, many South Asians in both India 
and East Africa anticipated that German East Africa would become an ‘Indian Colony’ as a tribute to the Asian 
contribution during the war. 
 Economic rights 
In 1914, the Committee of Indians was reorganized and became the Indian National 
Association of Zanzibar. Yusufali Esmailjee Jivanjee, the president of the association, 
presented a Memorandum on the Report of the Commission on Agriculture in 1923. He 
strongly criticized the government’s position that Indians were responsible for the 
indebtedness of agriculturalists (read Arabs and Swahili) in Zanzibar. In addition, he passed 
judgment on the method of collecting clove duties, which was particularly to the 
disadvantage of Asian clove producers.33  
These early South Asian grievances became the foundation of organized protests and 
led, eventually, to the establishment of the East African Indian Congress (EAINC) in 1914. The 
EAINC was modelled on the famous Indian National Congress and was a response to the 
growing emphasis on European interests throughout East Africa. The EAINC believed it 
would serve its members’ interests best by bringing Indian leaders in East Africa together 
and presenting their case on both a colonial and a national level. The exchange of ideas and 
experiences between the Indian National Congress and the EAINC resulted in shared 
opinions and a publication related to the Indian Question in the empire.  
Grievances about government legislation and high taxes – compared to what British 
and other European traders paid – continued in the 1920s and 1930s. Yusufali A. K. Jivanjee 
was the main spokesman for the Indian business community (Hindus and Muslims) in 
Zanzibar, and consistently made it clear that the Indians living there were not against any 
legislation in favour of Arabs and natives, but were against the policy of the government 
protecting one section of the Zanzibari community at the cost of another. When the British 
argued that they had reduced import duties for fresh butter and milk, ghee, and cigarettes, 
Jivanjee commented that it was the Europeans who used milk to feed their children, not the 
natives! In the case of ghee, only the middle and upper classes of the Indian population 
profited from the reductions because they used ghee, but the poorer sections of the 
community did not. In the case of cigarettes, Jivanjee demonstrated that the native – who 
only smoked two or three cigarettes a day – did not profit from a tax reduction of ‘eight to 
nine’ annas after every thousand cigarettes, unlike the Europeans, who smoked them in the 
hundreds and bought them in their thousands. Jivanjee added: “If His Excellency wishes to 
                                                 
33 Yusufali Esmailjee Jivanjee, Memorandum on the report of the commission on agriculture 1923 (Poona 1924). 
really benefit the poor natives, we want the duty on rice and kangas to be reduced! These 
are their real necessities. Then alone can we say that the Government is doing something for 
the natives.”34  After a handful of examples where Yusufali revealed that government 
legislation was to the disadvantage of the Indian trading community in Zanzibar, he 
concluded: [In other words] “the policy of the Government underlying this movement is to 
rob Indian Peter to pay British Paul.”35 
  The South Asian Tayabali Karimjee, who also lived in Zanzibar, often used the same 
line of argument. In a speech published in the Tanganyika Herald, he posed a fascinating 
rhetorical question: 
 
“One would like to know what would be the duration of residency for members of 
any particular race to acquire the same rights as those enjoyed by the indigenous 
population. For, be it remembered, according to historical evidence, Indians have 
been settled in East Africa for pretty nearly 400 years.”36 
 
  
In short, in the colonial era, the next step of the middleman minority’s catch-22 
arose. The South Asians would still enjoy a few of the privileges and incentives of the pre-
colonial area. They were allowed to practice their religions, some tax rates remained low, 
and their property rights were respected. However, this section has shown that the British 
rulers presented different futures and roles for the Asians in East Africa. Some colonial 
officials were very satisfied with the entrepreneurial role of this group. Indeed, as mentioned 
above, some of them, such as Johnston, even foresaw East Africa as the “America of the 
Hindu”. However, others, especially planters like Delamere, characterized the South Asians 
as untrustworthy exploiters of the local economy, and tried to alienate them by denying 
them civic rights, the right to own the most fertile lands, and the right to bear arms.  
The South Asians were quick to respond and wrote letters to colonial officials to 
make their case and claim equal rights. They were mainly deprived of their civic and 
economic rights, as they did not have the same (legal and political) access to land, licences 
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35  ibid 
36 The Tanganyika Herald 17th July 1937, 10. 
and other economic resources.  They may not always have obtained the desired results, but 
they could not be ignored. They felt that although they disagreed with some of the political 
outcomes of colonization, they were able to defend themselves politically. However, their 
situation was not comparable with that of the Asians in South Africa, whose role was much 
more restricted.  
The ambivalent relationship between the British colonist and the Asian Africans 
remained strong during the colonial era. It could be described as an arranged marriage 
where both parties were aware that they could not do without each other. At the same 
time, however, they used the interests of the child (in their perspective, the Africans) to 
serve their own interests and maintain the authority balance between the two of them. The 
British increasingly sustained the Africanization of the economy, and the civil service was set 
up in the colonial era. More often than not, the emancipation of the Africans came at the 
expense of the South Asians. In the post-colonial phase, the rights of the Africans came to 
the fore of the political agenda. Accordingly, the future of South Asians in the independent 
states of East Africa became increasingly uncertain.37 South Asians, on the whole, supported 
the African nationalist movement, but they were divided on the issue of the appropriate 
time for independence (as were the Europeans). While some South Asians supported the 
principle of African self-rule, others adopted a more cautious stance, realizing that their own 
economic and political positions were, again, at stake.38 This is discussed in the next section. 
 
                                                 
37  The best and detailed book on these issues is still Gregory’s India and East Africa. Recently, Ned Bertz has 
entered this field with an interesting publication, Ned Bertz, ‘Indian Ocean World Cinema: Viewing the History 
of Race, Diaspora and Nationalism in Urban Tanzania’, Africa 81:1(2011) 66-88. 
 
38 The extreme violence during the Mau Mau revolution (1952–1960) in Kenya made South Asians aware of the 
need to create constitutional safeguards for their future, Daniel Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, creating Kenya, 
(Cambridge 2009). 
Independent East Africa, 1961 to 2000 
 
The ultimate measuring stick for commitment and loyalty emerged on the eve of 
African independence. Asians in East Africa had to decide whether they would take up 
African (Tanzanian, Ugandan or Kenyan) citizenship or not. Accepting local citizenship would 
be the ultimate proof that Asian Africans were committed to the new African nations. Some 
South Asians, however, doubted whether African citizenship would protect their citizen and 
property rights in the long run, fearing that the continued Africanization of the economy 
would ultimately be at their expense. Moreover, accepting local citizenship implied that the 
Asian Africans had to give up their British subject status. At the same time, they realized that 
asking for privileges and guarantees would raise questions about their loyalties and 
interests; in these circumstances, a picture would then emerge of an affluent group that 
would only be an ally of the newly formed African nations if certain conditions were met. 39 
The constitutions of the independent East African states (Tanzania 1961, Uganda 
1962, Kenya 1963) gave those South Asians who were not automatically citizens by virtue of 
their birth (one of the parents as well as the applicant had to be born locally) an option to 
register as such within a grace period of two years. An important decision thus has to be 
made. There were three options.  
First, the South Asians could become East African (Ugandan, Kenya or Tanzanian) 
citizens. This would grant them voting rights and would enable them to obtain local trading 
licences. Nevertheless, it was foreseeable that in the near future it would be more 
problematic to travel to the United Kingdom (and Europe) with an African rather than a 
British passport. In addition, the South Asians realized that accepting African citizenship 
might not be enough to enforce citizen rights and the protection of their properties. 
Accordingly, if they wished to remain and keep their businesses in East Africa, they were 
inclined to accept local citizenship. Nevertheless, there were enough ambiguities to make 
them insecure and hesitant. Luckily, the British government had negotiated an option for the 
South Asians to register as citizens within a grace period of two years. 
                                                 
39 It is interesting to note that taking up Indian citizenship was not an option. The first president of India, 
Jawarlal Nehru, encouraged South Asians in East Africa to settle permanently there and align with the Africans 
and the African independence movement. He saw them neither as Indians nor as Africans. He would use the 
phrase “the guest race in Africa”. 
The second option was to remain a British subject. Many Asian Africans may, initially, 
have preferred this option. They supported the independence of African states in East Africa. 
They wished to continue their businesses, pay taxes, raise their families and promote the 
economic development of the countries they lived in. Therefore, they needed to know that 
there was a reasonable prospect that they could continue the life they had lived, including 
having access to trading licences. Remaining a British subject would, however, give them 
some extra advantages that were important, such as access to education in the United 
Kingdom. The South Asian upper and middle classes realized that the standard of higher 
education in East Africa was poor. Therefore, many elite Asians customarily sent their 
children to private schools in the United Kingdom. In addition, remaining as a British subject 
would also give these groups access to medical care and medical insurance in the UK. This 
was not yet available to the same standard in East Africa. Finally, British subjects could easily 
travel throughout the Commonwealth, which probably made them the first real ‘world 
citizens’.40 
The third option was to remain as undefined. Often this was not a conscious choice, 
but happened to those who failed to make up their minds. These people commonly 
remained active in the informal sector of East Africa.  
The choice between being a British subject or an African citizen was often a flip of a 
coin decision. Many South Asians used the grace period of two years, but were still 
undecided. Eventually, most families chose to take a mixed stance in the citizenship issue. 
Some male members would take up local citizenship, whereas many women and younger 
brothers decided to remain British subjects. In that sense, they could acquire trading licences 
and continue their local business, but at the same time enjoy medical care and education for 
their children in the United Kingdom.41 
                                                 
40 Prior to 1949, every person born within the dominions and allegiance of the British Crown (and no other) was 
a British subject. This meant that to be a British subject you simply had to be born in any territory under the 
sovereignty of the British Crown. In general, these subjects had the right to travel within the dominions, 
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in East Africa before the 1920s, more than 90% had multiple passports in their families. Similar observations 
can be found in: Pascal Herzig South Asians in Kenya. Gender, generation and changing identities in diaspora 
(Munster 2006).  
41 Hugh Tinker, Separate and unequal: India and the Indians in the British Commonwealth 1920-1950 (St. Lucia: 
1976). Hugh Tinker, The Banyan tree (Oxford: 1977). M.C. Lall, India's missed opportunity. India's relation with 
the non-resident Indians (Singapore 2001). 
While the South Asian communities in East Africa were discussing and negotiating 
their options, the new African states were under great pressure from their societies to 
Africanize the economy and civil service. The result was a number of discriminatory 
schemes, which introduced various systems of work permits and only allowed ‘non-Africans’ 
to take jobs that African citizens could not fulfil. There was a particular shortage of 
managerial and organizational skills. South Asian civil servants (whether they were citizens 
or not) were pushed out of their jobs to be replaced by Africans. In addition, the issuing of 
trading licences became a matter of concern for the South Asian community. The renewal of 
these licences for only one or two years caused economic insecurity. Moreover, the process 
of renewal was not transparent. Accordingly, it was open to corruption and so led to more 
uncertainty.42 As a consequence, the South Asians in East Africa made sure that they set up 
escape routes. However, African politicians as well as African societies were aware of these 
routes, which made them more critical of the loyalty of the South Asians. For them the 
question was: were these new citizens investors or exploiters?43 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the East African states increasingly took control of 
the majority of economic sectors, including foreign banks, insurance companies, key 
industries and import/export firms.44 In the most extreme example of Africanization in 
Uganda, President Idi Amin eventually expelled all of the South Asians living there. He 
presented his ironically named Asian farewell speech on fifth August 1972, when he gave the 
South Asians ninety days to pack up and leave. His main argument was that the British South 
Asians had come to build the railway, but this had now been completed so there was no 
need for them to remain. In this speech, as well as in earlier versions, Amin accused the 
South Asians of the economic sabotage of the country in that they were unwilling to invest in 
Uganda, but were removing resources from it. He did not make a distinction between 
Ugandan citizens of Asian descent and non-citizens.  
After Amin’s speech, South Asians had to leave the country within the ninety day 
period. The state was unwilling to protect this group’s basic human and economic rights. 
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Indeed, it was clear that their houses, shops and other properties were at risk of 
confiscation, and their physical and emotional well-being was also in danger, not least 
because of Amin’s control of the military. During the last few weeks of the ultimatum period, 
some 50,000 South Asians left the country, taking only what they could carry and no more 
than the £55 in cash that they were allowed to remove. In 1973, there were no more than 
1,000 South Asians remaining in Uganda.45 To most of this group, their expulsion came as a 
complete surprise. Initially, many who had heard the Asian farewell speech or read about it 
in the newspapers simply did not believe that it would become a reality.46 Then, when the 
first groups of South Asians living in Uganda took flight to the United Kingdom, the US, 
Canada and elsewhere, the Kenyan and Tanzanian South Asians came to believe that their 
businesses and lives could be at risk as well.  
Despite the fact that neither Kenya nor Tanzania adopted the Ugandan approach, 
political and economic insecurity in these countries also caused massive migration, and 
about half of their South Asian populations left. In Tanzania, the Arusha Declaration of 1967 
legitimized the nationalization of the main economic institutions, such as banking, insurance, 
industry and the acquisition of houses.47 In Kenya, the overall approach taken by the new 
government was focused on the need to build a strong indigenous class of traders, bankers 
and industrialists. However, the promotion of indigenous businesses was often at the 
expense of the development of South Asians; it was increasingly difficult for them to renew 
their trading licences or to get permits for new ventures or government loans.48 Some South 
Asian business families decided to keep one or two family members in the newly 
independent states to look after their (former) properties and businesses. In some 
exceptional cases, the people left behind became the managers (state employees) of their 
former properties.49 Those who departed would endeavour to build a new life in the United 
Kingdom, the United States or Canada. 
The political and economic development of the first decades of independent Uganda, 
Kenya and Tanzania illustrate the harsh consequences of being a successful immigrant 
businessman. The African states and local societies expected the South Asians to become 
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part of African society and to show their loyalty by accepting their new citizenship, but only 
about a third did so, as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Number of South Asians registered as citizens in East Africa, 1969. 
 Number of Asians in 1969 Number of Asians with local 
citizenship in 1969 
Tanzania 85,000 25,000 
Kenya 139,000 50,000 
Uganda 74,000 25,000 
Sources: The minority rights group, The new position of East Africa’s Asians (London 1984, 
first edition 1973). 
 
However, Amin did not make a distinction between citizens and non-citizens, 
expelling all South Asians, whatever their status. Consequently, Ugandan citizens of Asian 
descent did not enjoy the same rights as Ugandans of Ugandan descent. Meanwhile, the 
Tanzanian government nationalized industries that belonged to ‘nationals’, i.e. Tanzanian 
citizens. In other words, this is more compulsory acquisition than nationalization.  
The political situation had thus changed dramatically. In colonial days, the South 
Asians were excluded from land ownership. They also faced discriminatory trading 
regulations and argued for representation on various legal bodies (no taxation without 
representation). However, they were able to discuss their issues in the media, organizing 
conferences and mass meetings and visiting representatives of the British Empire in Nairobi, 
Zanzibar, Delhi and London. The British Empire was often unfair in the eyes of the South 
Asians, but the Idi Amin era was of a different order. The South Asians in East Africa, being 
formal Ugandan citizens, faced clear violations of their economic and civic rights. It was clear 
to them that there was no room to protest and they should leave the country as soon as 
possible.  
 
 
Concluding Observations 
For two centuries the South Asians in East Africa (Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya) have 
been a marked dominant minority, controlling an important part of the economy, while their 
numbers remained relatively small. In general, the South Asians offered credit, supplied 
goods and provided jobs. Overall, they were big taxpayers and therefore a main source of 
income for the rulers/state. Nevertheless, their economic success and the fact that they 
were a visible minority made them vulnerable to ethnic intolerance or hatred. They 
therefore developed escape strategies like using foreign bank accounts, sending their 
children overseas for their education or for jobs and using multiple passports in their families 
for economic, social and security reasons. These escape strategies remained an important 
source of prejudice and intolerance. In the eyes of the majority, these schemes were 
evidence of the fact that these minorities were not loyal to local economies and were only 
willing to exploit the area and its people. The marked dominant minorities, however, rightly 
emphasized that those who had taken up local citizenship were also expelled by Idi Amin 
from Uganda. In addition, the profitable factories and firms and the houses of many South 
Asians were nationalized in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. What’s more, their strategies 
to re-invest in the local African economy were not recognized, but nationalized. In short, 
they were caught in what I have labelled as the middleman minority’s catch-22. 
This catch-22 scenario did not emerge over night. In this article, I have taken a long-
term perspective by showing the continuity and change in the ambivalent relationships of 
South Asians in East Africa. The last two centuries have seen a dramatic change in the region, 
from having African and Arab rulers to the emergence of British and German colonies and, 
finally, to the independent states of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. In this period, the 
relationship of South Asians with the rulers/state was of great importance. Overall, they 
provided financial services and supplied goods and trade. However, they always realized that 
part of their economic success depended on the state and its rulers.  
The South Asians in East Africa have been a numerically small trading community for 
centuries. Their total numbers were never more than two per cent of the overall population. 
Nevertheless, they were disproportionately involved in trade and finance. Indeed, more 
often than not, they controlled an important aspect of the total trade and produce of the 
formal economy in the region. Over the centuries, they have served Arabic rulers, assisted 
colonial governments in developing the region, and were major traders and business families 
after independence. 
The different rulers developed ambiguous relationships with this outsider minority 
group. In general, their ambivalent attitude remained surprisingly constant. They were 
attracted to the South Asians’ financial services, but always kept them at a distance and 
viewed them with distrust. The South Asian minorities facilitated economic development in 
the region, but their success, well-being, and economic and physical security depended on 
the goodwill of the rulers. At times, they feared for their personal security, and local rulers 
were often unable – or unwilling – to defend their rights. 
The post-colonial East African states shifted the balance of power towards the 
indigenous people. With the exception of Idi Amin’s dictatorship, most policies were not 
directed against the South Asians specifically. Nevertheless, they were the ones who were 
affected the most. Becoming a formal citizen of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania did not 
guarantee the economic and physical security of the minorities living in those countries; nor 
did it protect their property rights. The access to citizenship, minority rights’ regulation and 
trading licences, and the lack of access to landownership, (senior) jobs in the civil service and 
the military, were all at stake to various extents in the period under research. In the post-
colonial world, Asian Africans were unable to claim their rights. The (colonial) governments 
had shown a strong ambivalence towards South Asians in East Africa, whereas there was 
some sort of mutual understanding in the pre-colonial area.  In short, if the ruling elites 
cannot find a way to accommodate economically successful minorities, and if the 
entrepreneurial minorities cannot convince local society and their rulers of their economic 
and political loyalty, they will always be caught in the middleman minority catch-22. 
